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Digital Computation as Information Processing 
 
Nir Fresco (student)1 
 
Abstract.1 It is common in cognitive science to equate 
computation (in particular digital computation) with in-
formation processing. Yet, it is hard to find a comprehen-
sive explicit account of concrete digital computation in 
information processing terms. An Information Processing 
account seems like a natural candidate to explain digital 
computation. After all, digital computers traffic in data. 
But when ‘information’ comes under scrutiny, this ac-
count becomes a less obvious candidate. 
 ‘Information’ may be interpreted semantically or non-
semantically, and its interpretation has direct implications 
for Information Processing as an objective account of 
digital computation. This paper deals with the implica-
tions of these interpretations for explaining concrete digi-
tal computation in terms of information processing. To 
begin with, I survey Shannon’s classic theory of infor-
mation, and then examine how ‘information’ is used in 
computer science. In the subsequent section, I evaluate 
the implications of how 'information' is interpreted for an 
Information Processing account. The key requirements 
for a physical system to compute are then fleshed out, as 
well as some of the limitations of such an account. Any 
Information Processing account must embrace an algo-
rithm-theoretic apparatus to be a plausible candidate 
for explaining concrete digital computation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Information Processing (hereafter, 
IP) account, for a system to be deemed a computing sys-
tem it needs to process data, which carries information. It 
is often assumed, particularly in cognitive science dis-
course, that symbolic computation models can freely be 
described as information processing models. This is the 
motivation for this paper, which deals with the question 
whether concrete digital computation (i.e., digital compu-
tation as it is actualised in physical systems) can be ade-
quately explained solely in information processing terms. 
 Furthermore, any resulting IP account hinges on the 
interpretation of 'information'. It can be interpreted se-
mantically or non-semantically (and more specifically 
quantitatively as ‘Shannon information’ or Algorithmic 
Information). It is questionable whether an IP account of 
computation must presuppose semantic information. The 
important question is then whether computing systems 
traffic in semantic information inherently, or whether 
they traffic in data or non-semantic information, which in 
turn could be assigned some meaning by users2. 
                                               
1 School of History and Philosophy, University of New South 
Wales, Sydney, Australia. Email: Fresco.Nir@Gmail.com 
2 I do not mean to imply here (as John Searle would) that the 
idea of concrete computation requires something like a knower 
or an observer. A computing system will continue computing 
 A general account of Information Processing based on 
'Shannon information' is outlined here in the context of 
concrete digital computation. I begin by survey-
ing Shannon’s classic theory of information in section 2, 
and then examine whether Algorithmic Information theo-
ry significantly changes the resulting IP account, in the 
third section. Subsequently, in section 4, I discuss the 
implications of how 'information' is interpreted for ex-
plaining concrete digital computation. The key require-
ments implied by the IP account for a physical system to 
perform digital computation are explicated in section 5. 
Eventually, in section 6, I examine the limitations of this 
account and argue that any IP account must embrace 
an algorithm-theoretic apparatus to be a plausible candi-
date for explaining concrete digital computation. 
 
2. THE RECEIVED THEORY OF INFOR-
MATION IN COMMUNICATION 
The most influential theory of information in communi-
cation and engineering was introduced by Claude Shan-
non in 1948. He showed how information could be 
transmitted efficiently across communication channels by 
means of encoded messages. Shannon [1] attempted to 
solve the “fundamental problem of communication”: 
finding the optimal manner by which messages from a 
source of information are exactly or approximately re-
produced at their destination [2]. According to Norbert 
Wiener [3], one of the simplest unitary forms of infor-
mation is the recording of a choice between two equi-
probable basic alternatives. A sufficient condition for a 
physical system to be deemed a sender or receiver of 
information is the production of a sequence of symbols in 
a probabilistic manner. 
 Moreover, Shannon [1] and Wiener [3] analyse an 
information-generating system in terms of five essential 
components: an information source, a transmitter, a chan-
nel, a receiver and a destination. The information source 
produces a message to be communicated to the receiver. 
The transmitter operates on the message to produce a 
signal suitable for transmission over the channel, which is 
simply the medium of signal transmission. The receiver 
reconstructs the message from the signal. And the desti-
nation is the system for which the message is intended. 
So communication amounts to the source of information 
producing a sequence of symbols, which is then repro-
duced by the receiver to some degree of accuracy. 
 Nevertheless, ‘Shannon information’ does not entail 
any semantic content or meaning. Shannon’s information 
theory approaches information syntactically as a physical 
                                                                    
even in our absence, as long as it does not break and has a con-
stant supply of energy to run. 
58
 
 
phenomenon: whether and how much (not what) infor-
mation is conveyed [4]. On the other hand, a stronger 
sense of 'information' (i.e., semantic information) entails 
that messages have specific meanings by representing 
how things are or could be. 
 According to Shannon’s theory, ‘information’ is inter-
preted in the weaker sense. 'Shannon information’ is dif-
ferent (but not distinct) from the ordinary usage of 'in-
formation'; it tells us nothing about the usefulness of or 
interest in a message. The basic idea is coding messages 
into a binary (or any other) system at the bare minimum 
of bits we need to send to get our message across. Even 
in this limited sense, the amount of ‘information’ con-
veyed is as much a property of our own knowledge as 
anything in the message. If we send the same message 
twice every time (a message and its copy), the infor-
mation in the two messages is not the sum of that in each. 
Rather the information only comes from the first one 
(assuming it was successfully transmitted) [5]. 
 The important aspect of ‘Shannon information’ is that 
the message is selected from a set of possible messages. 
A message, composed of symbols, is a physical structure 
discriminated by the probability of selecting it over other 
possible messages. So a nonsensical message composed 
of the sequence of symbols ‘%3-4Y7@*’ could in es-
sence generate more information than a meaningful mes-
sage (in the ordinary use of ‘information’) such as 
‘daughter’ in reply to some question. This could be the 
case, if the message ‘%3-4Y7@*’ would be more “sur-
prising” than ‘daughter’ [2]. Receiving a message con-
taining the former string could change the recipient’s 
circumstance from not knowing what something was to 
knowing what it is. The more possible messages a recipi-
ent could have otherwise received, the more “surprised” 
the recipient is when it gets that particular message [5]. 
 
3. INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SCI-
ENCE 
Shannon’s theory of information is the reigning theory in 
communication and can adequately explain network 
communication between computers, encoding and decod-
ing of messages, message transmission through data bus-
es or network cables and so on. Algorithmic Information 
theory, which was introduced by Andrei Kolmogorov, 
Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin, deals with the 
complexity of data structures and can be described as the 
borderland where information and digital computation 
meet. It formally defines the complexity or the informa-
tional content of a data structure (e.g., a string) as the 
length of its shortest self-delimiting algorithm running on 
a Universal Turing Machine (henceforth, UTM) [6] [7]. 
The algorithmic information of any computable string is 
the length of the shortest algorithm that computes it on a 
UTM. 
 Moreover, Chaitin proposes to think of a computing 
system as a decoding device at the receiving end of a 
noiseless binary communications channel [6]. Its pro-
grams are thought of as code words, and the result of the 
computation (i.e., its output) as the decoded message. The 
programs then form what is called a “prefix-free” set so 
that successive messages (e.g., procedures) sent across 
the channel can be distinguished from one another. Still 
he acknowledges that Algorithmic Information has pre-
cisely the formal properties of Shannon's concept of in-
formation entropy. 
 Although Algorithmic Information is underpinned by 
classical computability theory, it too is non-semantic and 
quantitative as Shannon’s theory. It interprets information 
and measures its quantities in terms of the computational 
resources that are needed to specify it [4]. Algorithmic 
Information measures the length of the shortest algorithm 
that computes a string. That algorithm may even be 
shorter than the output it produces. For example, repre-
senting ! or e in a binary notation [7].  
 Algorithmic Information then may be deemed a com-
peting notion of 'Shannon information' by allowing us to 
assign complexity values to individual strings and other 
data types [8]. Whilst Shannon’s theory analyses the 
amount of information in a group of messages based on 
the probability of the messages, Algorithmic Information 
theory analyses the complexity of a string as a single 
message. The relative frequency of the message has no 
meaning, but there is some shortest program on a UTM 
that can produce this message. The length of this optimal 
program is an absolute measure for the amount of infor-
mation in that message. Both Algorithmic Information 
and ‘Shannon information’ give rise to optimal compres-
sion codes for information. A bit string 
‘01010101010101’ can be compressed in Shannon's sense 
as '01'=1;1111111, or can be programmed in the Algo-
rithmic Information sense as for x = 1 to 7 write '01' [8]. 
 
4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERPRET-
ING ‘INFORMATION’ FOR THE IP AC-
COUNT 
Most structural accounts of concrete computation assume 
that it is a type of information processing. These accounts 
consider the unique structural properties of computing 
systems (namely, their digital architectures) to be their 
distinctive feature. But in addition to the structural con-
straint, they also assume a semantic constraint on con-
crete computation: processing information [9]. Some 
connectionists, on the other hand, reject the structural 
constraint, and argue that information-processing proper-
ties of digital computation differentiate it from other 
causal and mechanical processes. On their view, concrete 
computation is explained in terms of the information 
transformed, represented, and stored in the process of 
computing [10]. 
 Still, any current attempt to untangle concrete compu-
tation and IP must begin with a distinction between a 
weaker sense of ‘information’ (e.g., 'Shannon infor-
mation' or Algorithmic Information) and semantic infor-
mation. Using informational language in the stronger 
sense raises some problems in regard to concrete compu-
tation (e.g., does a computer process semantic infor-
mation even in the absence of its user? is the meaning of 
the computer-processed information intrinsic? if some 
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information processing carries meaning and some does 
not, how are they distinguished? etc.).  
 Even if we interpreted the IP account in Shannon’s 
sense, it would be hard to accept it as a satisfactory ac-
count of concrete digital computation. Brian Cantwell 
Smith [11] argues that since information theory is not a 
full analysis of information, it cannot be a solid basis for 
a comprehensive account of concrete computation. His 
argument relies on a semantic reading of both infor-
mation [11] and computation [12], and if ‘Shannon in-
formation’ is not semantic, it cannot adequately explain 
computation. Moreover, Piccinini and Scarantino [2] 
maintain that it is not clear how ‘Shannon information’ is 
processed. Whether ‘Shannon information' can be associ-
ated with a given vehicle does not depend on any specif-
ic physical properties. Instead, it is regarded as a selec-
tion of symbols from a given language according to the 
probability distribution of these symbols. Shannon infor-
mation does not pertain to individual messages, and indi-
vidual messages are those that may be created, and ma-
nipulated by digital computing systems. 
 Also, digital computation may be either deterministic 
or non-deterministic (e.g., probabilistic computation, 
random computation etc.). Still, most digital computing 
systems developed in the computer industry are determin-
istic, since their behaviour is repeatable and systematic. A 
dry run of a deterministic algorithm (using some test 
data) should systematically yield the same output when 
its input and initial state remain unchanged. The state-
transitions of Shannon's communication model are prob-
abilistic, whereas the transition probabilities of a Turing 
machine (hereafter, TM) are all set to 1. For every possi-
ble input, there is only one possible state into which the 
TM transitions [13]. 
 Be that as it may, analysing digital computation using 
information-theoretic language could be very construc-
tive. Smith [11] asserts that the IP account could indeed 
serve as the grounds for a plausibly comprehensive theo-
ry of concrete computation. But on his view several theo-
retical issues must first be addressed. Firstly, only a se-
mantic theory of information stands a chance of doing 
justice to computation. Secondly, ‘information’ must be 
analysed in a manner that does not entail pan-
informationalism. Otherwise, this could lead to a danger-
ous equivocation: if any object can be described in in-
formational terms, then the nature of all objects is genu-
inely informational. At least prima facie, concrete digital 
computation being driven by the executed software seems 
most likely amenable to instructional information (e.g., 
do X if Y, otherwise halt) [14]. 
 
5. THE KEY REQUIREMENTS IMPLIED 
BY THE IP ACCOUNT 
The key requirements for a physical system to perform 
digital computation implied by the IP account are four-
fold: 1. having the capacity to send information, 2. having 
the capacity to receive information, 3. having the capacity 
to store and retrieve information, 4. having the capacity 
to process (or transform) information. The choice be-
tween a semantic and a non-semantic reading of ‘infor-
mation’ affects both the characterisation of the resulting 
IP account and the key requirements it implies for com-
puting systems, as will be shown below. The following 
discussion remains neutral on the semantic vs. non-
semantic reading of 'information', unless specified other-
wise. 
 The first key requirement implied by the IP account is 
the system having the capacity to send information. 
Whether ‘information’ is interpreted semantically or non-
semantically, concrete computation requires a source of 
information to transmit the data. Regardless of the medi-
um by which the data is transmitted (e.g., via data buses, 
network cables, etc.), the sender is responsible for the 
data transmission. The sender prepares the messages to be 
sent to the receiver and encodes them for transmission. 
To emphasise, in computing systems the sender and the 
source of information may be distinct entities. For in-
stance, whilst the computer’s main memory could be a 
source of information (e.g., a stored instruction), the 
memory controller is responsible for fetching the data 
from memory and transmitting it to the CPU. The 
memory controller acts as the sender, but not as the 
source. 
 Analogously, the second key requirement implied by 
the IP account is the system having the capacity to re-
ceive information. If the former requirement necessitated 
a sender to transmit the message, this requirement neces-
sitates a receiver on the other end to accept it. The ab-
sence of a receiver on the other end means that the com-
putation remains unexecuted (or in a suspend mode). For 
instance, an instruction, which was fetched by the main 
control unit from the memory, but not received by the 
receiver (the CPU in this case), will not be executed. 
Also, a computer program (the sender), which sends an 
input/output signal to the operating system (the receiver), 
will enter the suspend mode until its I/O request is 
acknowledged.  
 Furthermore, when construed as information pro-
cessing, concrete digital computation is at best incom-
plete in the absence of either a receiver or a sender. Un-
like a microphone acting as a sender of information even 
in the absence of a receiver (the audience), a computing 
system must have both a sender and a receiver that are 
well coordinated. The information contained in a message 
may indeed not depend on the receiver’s learning some-
thing from it, or even being able to decode the message 
[15]. But if the receiver is absent or unable to decode the 
message in a computing system, the computation will be 
either incomplete or incorrect. Suppose that the CPU (the 
receiver) is unable to correctly decode the instruction 
from the main control unit (the sender), it will fail to 
execute the instruction hindering the overall computation. 
 The third key requirement implied by the IP account is 
the system having the capacity to store and retrieve in-
formation. Computing systems store and retrieve digital 
information, which can be thought of as a series of bits. 
The storage and retrieval of information in a computing 
system should be well synchronised, as one always pre-
supposes the other. Without the system having the ability 
to retrieve the data, there is clearly very little sense to 
storing it in the first place. 
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 Lastly, the fourth key requirement implied by the IP 
account is the system having the capacity to transform 
information. This requirement cannot be dismissed, as it 
the essence of processing of information. It is also the 
most problematic requirement, which becomes even more 
stringent when ‘information’ is interpreted semantically 
(as will be shown below). It is important to emphasise 
that transforming information does not amount to merely 
encoding and decoding information. Those are methods 
that typically preserve the information while converting it 
into a coded form and vice versa, and are useful in the 
communication of signals or messages. Transformation of 
information is more than that, it is characterised as the 
creation (e.g., a new database table containing salaries of 
employees), modification (e.g., giving some employees a 
pay rise) and destruction of information (e.g., deleting 
some records of employees, who left the company, from 
the system). 
 The transformation or processing of ‘Shannon infor-
mation’ is problematic, because its focus is not on the 
content of individual messages. To restate Wiener’s claim 
[3], a sufficient condition for a physical system to be 
deemed a sender or receiver of ‘Shannon information’ is 
the production of messages in a probabilistic manner. 
Processing ‘Shannon information’ can be the modifica-
tion of the state or strings states that may result in chang-
es of the conditional entropies among the states. It can 
also be the elimination of possibilities (reduction in un-
certainty) represented by a signal or the introduction of 
redundancy to offset the impact of noise and equivoca-
tion. But again, sending the same message twice (to offset 
the impact of noise) does not yield information that is the 
sum of that in each. Similarly, elimination of redundancy 
does not reduce the underlying informational content that 
is conveyed. 
 Moreover, construing concrete digital computation as 
information processing requires more than merely com-
municating information in a non-deterministic manner. 
Telephones (not the voice over internet protocol systems) 
are information processing systems, but they are not digi-
tal computers [13]. They can be used to transmit infor-
mation, but they certainly do not compute in any non-
trivial sense. Computers do indeed encode, decode and 
transmit information, but they also perform tasks with 
inferential import (when I try to divide a number by 0, a 
good algorithm should yield an error message from the 
computing system). Yet, this requires a way of distin-
guishing the differences between the informational con-
tents of the messages. Shannon’s information provides 
the procedures for selecting messages, but it lacks this 
capacity [15]. 
 Still, this ability to distinguish between different con-
tents is necessary for modifying or adding new justified 
information. Shannon's information theory tells us about 
the probabilities associated with symbols from a given 
language, but it is indifferent to the content of the mes-
sages. For instance, the strings S1 and S2 have the same 
length (including that of their symbol constituents), but a 
different composition of symbol constituents. S1= “All 
cars have four wheels”; S2= “All cats have four ankles”. 
Let us suppose that S1 and S2 are equiprobable (so in 
Shannon's sense, they are both potentially equally in-
formative). Let S3 be “Bumblebee is a car”. By using 
Universal Instantiation, for example, one can infer some 
new justified information3: S4= “Bumblebee has four 
wheels” from S1 and S3. This new information must also 
be true, if S1 and S3 are true (here enters semantic infor-
mation again). It tells us something else about Bumblebee 
(that Bumblebee has four wheels). 
 On the other hand, S2 and S3 do not yield new justified 
information using Universal Instantiation (similar to S4). 
One cannot validly infer any new singular statement 
about Bumblebee from the universal statement S2, as 
Universal Instantiation does not apply to S3 (for Bumble-
bee is not a cat). In order to apply rules of logic as a 
means of generating new true information, the symbolic 
constituents of strings must be distinguishable. But ac-
cording to Shannon's information theory we may encode 
and transmit S2 (rather than S1) and S3 to the recipient 
(since S1 and S2 are equiprobable). Yet, the recipient will 
have learned nothing new from S2 and S3 in this case. 
 Furthermore, when ‘information’ is construed seman-
tically (as proposed by some philosophers) its transfor-
mation requirement becomes even more stringent. The 
syntactical manipulation of messages must be done in a 
manner that always preserves their semantics. Typically, 
rules that are applied in the transformation process must 
be truth preserving4. At the very least, new justified in-
formation has to be consistent with prior “known” infor-
mation. If conjunction, for instance, is applied to add new 
justified information, then the conjuncts C1 and C2 must 
be neither contradictories nor contraries. Otherwise, their 
conjunction ‘C1 and C2‘ would be false. 
 Likewise, when syllogistic rules are applied in the 
process of transforming semantic information, syllogistic 
fallacies must be prevented5. For instance, when deduc-
tive inference is used to validly infer P3 from the premis-
es P1 and P2 (where P1!P3 and P2!P3), then P3 must be 
true to be deemed new (or modified) semantic infor-
mation. Not only that, but the error detection mechanism 
employed by the computing system must be such that it 
verifies that every single premise (P1 and P2, in the ex-
ample above) is true6, even if the deductive argument is 
valid. Thus, to extract new semantic information, suffi-
cient scrutiny is required to ensure its truth and coher-
ence. The same principle also applies to other types of 
                                               
3 There is an ongoing debate regarding information in deductive 
inferences. Some, including John S. Mill and the logical positiv-
ists, have argued that logical truths are tautologies, and so deduc-
tive reasoning does not add any new information. 
4 Induction, abduction and non-monotonic logic do not abide by 
the same principle, and their application does not guarantee the 
truth of any new information that they potentially create. Both 
abductive reasoning and non-monotonic logic play an important 
role in artificial intelligence and should not be discounted, but 
they exceed the scope of this paper. 
5 In particular, when interpreting semantic information as being 
necessarily true [4] [15] [16]. 
6 Immediate inferences from categorical propositions, for in-
stance, do not require the same error verification mechanism. 
From the categorical proposition ‘no dogs are cats’, we can 
immediately infer that ‘no cats are dogs’ by swapping the predi-
cate term and subject term of the original proposition. The truth 
of one of them guarantees the truth of the other. 
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transformation rules like existential generalisations, uni-
versal instantiations, inductive inferences and so on. 
 Still, digital computation will proceed (or fail) regard-
less of the truth-value of the information processed by the 
computing system. Gricean non-natural meaning of signs 
(e.g., three dings of the bus bell indicating that the bus is 
full) does not require a correspondence to the state of 
affairs in question (e.g., whether the bus is actually full). 
In a similar manner, non-natural information may be 
processed by the computing system without any corre-
spondence to an external state of affairs. There is always 
a possibility that a computing system will produce an 
incorrect output as a result of a miscomputation7 (i.e., a 
mistake in the computation process due to an error in the 
executed algorithm or a hardware malfunction). In that 
case, the only viable option is that the miscomputation 
misrepresents the state of affairs in question8. But from 
the system's “point of view”, this wrong output has no 
less (or more) meaning than the correct output (which 
might correctly correspond to some state of affairs). 
Whether a computation represents some state of affairs or 
not is a contingent fact. 
 
6. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE IP AC-
COUNT 
When ‘information’ is interpreted narrowly the resulting 
IP account cannot adequately explain how computation is 
executed and how it differs from miscomputation. Any 
plausible account of concrete digital computation must be 
able to explain Turing computability, for it lays the 
ground rules for all existing digital computers as well as 
for programming languages. Any account of Turing com-
putability has to at least be able to explain the three key 
algorithmic notions of input, output, and procedures. But 
an IP account of concrete computation, which is based on 
'Shannon Information' or Algorithmic Information, does 
not adequately explain those three key notions. 
 'Shannon information', for one, only makes sense in 
the context of a set of potential messages that are com-
municated between a sender and a receiver and a proba-
bility distribution over this set [8]. There is no room for a 
probabilistic selection of messages in describing deter-
ministic procedures. There must be a specific set of mes-
sages that are selected, encoded and transmitted in the 
same order in accordance with the specific steps of the 
procedure, regardless of the probabilities associated with 
each message (or its symbol constituents). 
                                               
7 Besides these two types of syntactic miscomputation, there is 
also the possibility of a semantic miscomputation relative to 
some task domain (e.g., the Roomba indoor cleaning robot that 
may malfunction eventually when it operates under abnormal 
operating conditions such as an airfield). However, this semantic 
miscomputation can also be reduced to either one of the syntac-
tic miscomputations above. 
8 There is always also the remote possibility of a double nega-
tion. Suppose that the computing system did not correctly repre-
sent some state of affairs when the computation was initiated. 
But then the system’s miscomputation incidentally results in a 
correct representation of that state of affairs. 
 Whilst Algorithmic Information is indeed based on 
TMs, it is still insufficient as an IP account of concrete 
computation. Algorithmic Information theory's interest in 
TMs is limited to finding the shortest program that runs 
on a UTM and generates a particular string as its output. 
But the purpose of Algorithmic Information theory is 
simply to measure the amount of information conveyed 
by that string or its complexity, rather than being about 
that program. So the best one could hope for in relation 
to Algorithmic Information explaining a particular proce-
dure is either measuring the information conveyed by that 
procedure (as a string) or determining whether it is the 
shortest one for generating the output it produces. Yet, 
many computer programs running on multitudes of dif-
ferent systems are neither the shortest nor the most effi-
cient for achieving their tasks.  
 Another challenge for an IP account of concrete com-
putation, which is based on 'Shannon information' or 
Algorithmic Information, is identifying miscomputations. 
Miscomputations that are the result of a hardware mal-
function could be explained by some breakdown of the 
communication channel, for example. But other miscom-
putations resulting from errors by design or a malformed 
algorithm cannot be easily explained, since neither Shan-
non's information theory nor Algorithmic Information 
distinguishes messages by their contents. 
 Arguably, when information is interpreted semantical-
ly it must yield knowledge [4] [7] [11] [15] and that im-
plies a further requirement for a semantic IP account of 
concrete computation. This additional requirement is that 
by processing information the computing system has to 
yield knowledge, which is either derived from its user (or 
programmer or interpreter) or intrinsic to the system. 
Plato defined knowledge as a true justified belief (which 
was widely accepted in modern philosophy9). Semantic 
information must tell us something true about some state 
of affairs, that is, yield knowledge. One option then is 
that this knowledge is derivative and used by the knower, 
who uses the information produced by the computing 
system10. Another option is that this knowledge is intrin-
sic to the computing system that traffics in information.  
 The latter option has been challenged by many philos-
ophers [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] and it is not at all 
clear that there is compelling evidence to support it. 
There is only a limited sense in which a digital computing 
system “understands” or “knows” something. A digital 
computer understands the semantics of its machine lan-
guage. This understanding can be attributed to structural 
properties of the machine’s architecture and language as 
well as causal links between bit patterns, memory ad-
dresses, primitive operations etc. Computers manipulate 
information that they need not understand, although they 
copy it, compare it with other information and change it 
                                               
9 Edmund Gettier [17] has challenged Plato’s widely accepted 
view of knowledge as Justified True Belief. He argued that truth, 
belief, and justification are not sufficient conditions for 
knowledge. He showed that a true belief might be justified but 
fail to be knowledge, because the belief might be true by 
sheer accident. 
10 Indeed, this option is no more problematic than an encyclo-
paedia yielding knowledge for its readers. 
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[24]. This is the basis for an internal meaning of its in-
formation processing.  
 But that does not imply that the computer manifests 
any beliefs that are associated with these operations. 
Suppose we replace the doorbell with a digital computer 
that emits the sounds: “someone is at the door”, only 
when someone pushes the door button. When someone 
pushes the door button, the computer picks up the infor-
mation about it, processes it and delivers an output. How-
ever, this output is not a belief in someone being at the 
door, anymore than the doorbell would have believed that 
[15]. Roy Sorensen [25] makes a further distinction be-
tween information conveyed by assertions and displays. 
When an answering machine utters the sounds: "Mr. 
Smith is not at home", it simply displays this message, 
rather than assert it. The machine does not believe that 
Mr. Smith is not at home (he may even be home). Simi-
larly, when a computer weather program displays a rainy 
weather forecast for tomorrow, it does not believe that it 
will rain tomorrow, although this output may be based on 
a reliable source of information. There is no intrinsic 
belief or knowledge in these information-processing sys-
tems. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Although the IP account, on the face of it, seems like a 
natural and promising candidate for explaining concrete 
digital computation, it is less than obvious. This is to a 
large extent dependent on how information is interpreted 
and what the resulting IP account is. Some argue that an 
adequate theory of information must give an account of 
information as semantic content [15] [4]. Smith [11] as-
serts that even on a semantic interpretation of infor-
mation, the IP account is still inadequate, because infor-
mation, which depends on a counterfactual correlation 
with the world, is objective. But without further re-
striction this account leads to pan-informationalism. And 
indeed an IP account, which leads to pan-
informationalism, is not falsifiable and incapable of non-
trivially explaining concrete digital computation. 
 Nevertheless, the IP account must embrace an algo-
rithm-theoretic apparatus to be deemed adequate for ex-
plaining computation. As I have argued above, it is the 
processing part of IP that is very problematic. Arguably, 
even Algorithmic Information in the form of Kolmogo-
rov-Chaitin-Solomonoff complexity will not do the trick 
for the IP account. Though it interprets information in 
terms of the computational resources needed to specify 
that information, it is a measurement method (i.e., analys-
ing complexities, probabilities and randomness), rather 
than a descriptive one (e.g., explaining whether a mis-
computation has just occurred).  
 All the above suggests that to be a plausible candidate 
for explaining concrete digital computation the IP ac-
count needs improving. If we want to explain certain 
cognitive functions computationally in terms of infor-
mation processing, we should first be clear on how con-
crete digital computation proper is explained non-trivially 
in information processing terms. An IP account of com-
putation should explain how a computing system is dif-
ferent from other non computing IP systems such as tele-
phones or radios. 
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